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1. Introduction 
With extended data storage space and advanced wireless transmission capability, Radio 
Frequency IDentification (RFID) is rapidly deployed to replace barcode position in our daily 
lives and considered as the next generation identification technology in ubiquitous 
communication environment. The most important key factor of RFID technology is to enable 
systems with the ability to automatically identify labeled objects without the constraint of 
line of sight. RFID technology is a well known AIDC (Automatic Identification and Data 
Capture) technology to provide the benefits including contactless read, long transmission 
range and transaction time saving (Garfinkel & Rosenberg, 2005). Most of innovative 
applications designed for RFID system can be divided into following classes such as asset 
management, tracking, authenticity verification, matching, process control, access control, 
automated payment and supply chain management (Karygiannis et al., 2007). 
In spite that the adoption of RFID technology becomes popular in a board range of 
applications, the cost of a RFID tag is still too expensive to be fully adopted by logistic and 
retailer industries. Even though from the logistic and retailer industries point of view, to 
label RFID tags on all sale items is still cost-prohibitive under the current price of a passive 
RFID tag. Nevertheless, the convenience of RFID technology still has a great attraction for 
inventory management. For example, in 2005, Wal-Mart which is the biggest retailer in 
America declared a new policy to force its top 500 suppliers to adopt RFID technology for 
inventory management; otherwise, Wal-Mart will deny new transaction contracts from 
those who do not comply this new policy. Because of this policy, all top 500 suppliers start 
to apply RFID tags onto their merchandises by spending and absorbing extra RFID cost. In 
contrary, the introduction of RFID technology can provide great benefits for Wal-Mart to 
control logistic process accurately, replenish empty stock efficiently and lower space 
requirement for goods storage. 
Although the widespread use of RFID technology makes human life better than past, the 
security invasion and user privacy disclosure are still concerned by individuals and 
organizations. For example, in 2006, Metro AG which is the biggest supermarket chain store 
in Germany used the RFID technology to not only automatically manage production and 
stock but also help customers search their target items quickly. Metro AG gave VIP cards to 
the top 10% customers and based on the historical shopping behaviors of a VIP customer to 
recommend products nearby the customer’s current location. However, Metro AG did not 
notify VIP customers that the VIP card is embedded with RFID. Three months later, a VIP O
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member curiously disassembled his card and recognized the RFID secret of the VIP card. 
About ten thousand members’ location privacy is at risk of disclosure because the unique 
customer number stored in each VIP card can be easily read by a malicious stalker using a 
handheld RFID reader. 
As we mentioned above, the RFID technology faces serious security threats and privacy 
concern (Juels et al., 2005; Weis, 2003). Wireless communication and cost-down 
consideration on RFID systems are the two main factors that cause these security threats. In 
RFID operation environment, a passive RFID tag must be powered and triggered by a 
broadcast signal through the forward channel from a RFID reader, and the reader receives 
the response from the tag via the backscatter channel. An adversary may capture 
transmitted messages between reader and tag easily with wireless eavesdropping device. 
Furthermore, an adversary can utilize the captured messages to invoke other attacks such as 
object tracking, tag compromise and tag impersonation. In short, the concerns on 
information security and privacy protection will impede the future development of RFID 
technology. In order to secure data integrity, data confidentiality, non-repudiation, and 
availability of a RFID system, a straight forward thought is to apply existing authentication 
protocols on wireless networks. However, due to the nature of restricted computation 
ability and limited memory storage of a low-cost passive RFID tag, it is difficult to 
implement a secure or robust RFID system with powerful cryptographic operations such as 
RSA, DES, and AES (Datasheet Helion Technology, 2005) as existing authentication 
protocols did. 
In the past five years, many researchers had proposed ideas to protect data security and user 
privacy (Weis et al., 2003; Lo & Yeh, 2007) on RFID systems. These researches use powerful 
cryptographic operations (Feldhofer et al., 2004; Kumar & Paar, 2006) such as symmetric key 
encryption, public key infrastructure and one-way hash function to prevent information 
leakage. Although those operations can provide strong protection to defend against 
malicious attacks, low-cost RFID tags with highly constrained resource are not able to carry 
out expensive cryptographic primitives to perform strong authentication. In fact, a passive 
tag can only contain 5K – 10K gates; on the contrary, a cryptographic primitive requires 250 
– 3K gates. Hence, powerful encryptions are hardly possible to be built in a passive tag in 
the near future. In order to comply with the resource constraint, a few new authentication 
protocols with lightweight encryptions (Peris-Lopez et al., 2006; Chien, 2007; Yu et al., 2007; 
Juels, 2005) are invented to fit the physical limitation of a passive tag. However, those 
proposed schemes cannot provide enough security level in general; more specifically, they 
cannot prevent all major or general attacks such as eavesdropping, tracking, replay attack 
and Denial of Service, and preserve the forward secrecy of tagged object at the same time. 
Therefore, in order to successfully defend against those security threats, we propose a new 
secure mutual authentication protocol for low-cost RFID systems, named as SMAP-LRS, to 
achieve higher security level and be compatible with the hardware restriction of passive 
RFID tag at the same time. The design of SMAP-LRS protocol adopts simple cryptographic 
operations to comply with existing RFID standards. In addition, a bit flag mechanism is 
introduced in our scheme to resolve the Denial of Service attack and save the memory space 
for protocol implementation at backend server. 
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews previous work on RFID 
authentication protocol. Next, we propose a new authentication scheme for low-cost RFID  
system in section 3. The security analysis of our scheme is presented in section 4. Finally, we 
summarize our conclusion in section 5. 
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2. Related work 
In recent years, the vast literatures have addressed the security and privacy concerns on the 
use of RFID tags. Based on the type of encryption primitive used on RFID system, we 
classify  RFID authentication protocols into four classes. The first class of RFID 
authentication protocol is hash-based. Most of those schemes only use hash function for 
data encryption. In 2003, Weis et al. (Weis et al., 2003) proposed a new authentication 
protocol for RFID system using hash function to achieve data security and user privacy. In 
their hash-based access control mechanism, the tag does not change its identification in 
authentication sessions. An adversary can easily trace his target RFID object by 
eavesdropping the same ID transmitted through air interface. Ohkubo et al. (Ohkubo et al., 
2003) developed a secure authentication protocol based on hash chain mechanism. This 
scheme provides indistinguishability and forward security. Through their scheme, a RFID 
tag can generate a responding message whose content is indistinguishable from truly 
random value to achieve indistinguishability.  At the same time, the property of forward 
security is preserved because even if an adversary gathers information from transmitted 
messages during authentication sessions and the secret data stored in a compromised tag, 
the adversary still cannot derive the secret information of the tag before it is compromised. 
However, this scheme cannot resist replay attack. Henrici & Müller (Henrici & Müller, 2004) 
proposed a novel authentication which is based on hash function to provide anonymity and 
location privacy by updating tag identification in each session. Nevertheless, the tag always 
responds reader query with the same hashed value of identification before the tag 
successfully updates its current identification at the end of authentication session. This 
security flaw allows an attacker to track a specific tag by eavesdropping.  
The second class of RFID authentication protocol utilizes hash function and random-number 
generator. Weis et al. also proposed another authentication protocol in their paper (Weis et 
al., 2003) by using randomized access control and hash function. The advanced scheme 
certainly provides stronger anonymity property than the previous hash-based scheme they 
derived. However, the backend server does not update the database information at all after 
authentication. An adversary can eavesdrop the transmitted messages between a reader and 
tags, as well as injecting arbitrary messages into the communication channel. In other 
words,  the adversary can impersonate the original tags and send arbitrary message to 
backend server until the next authentication session. An and Oh (An & Oh, 2005) developed 
a new authentication protocol which is based on hash function and random number 
generator. Although authors claimed that their scheme provide data security in different 
databases, this scheme cannot prevent replay attack and tag tracking. Rhee et al. (Rhee et al., 
2005) proposed a challenge-response protocol for authentication to enhance the anonymity 
and resist replay attack via hash function and pseudo-random number generator. 
Unfortunately this scheme cannot efficiently support forward secrecy when it encounters 
adversary attacks. Once the tag is compromised, the adversary can derive or identify the 
past transmitted messages through revealed secret information from the tag. Kim et al. (Kim 
et al., 2006) proposed a new scheme which generates stream blocks to update the shared 
secret information between tag and backend server in an authentication process. Their 
scheme supports tag anonymity and relay attack resistance. However, the identification of 
tag can be calculated by using XOR operation with the transmitted message consisting of EID 
and random value R2’; the adversary can use the specific characteristic to track a tag 
virtually anywhere. A new authentication protocol which is based on AES encryption 
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primitive is designed by Feldhofer et al. (Feldhofer et al., 2004). Although the scheme 
reaches the strongest level of security requirement, it is not suitable for systems using low-
cost RFID tags since the computing capability of a passive tag at present cannot support 
such large computation workload as the AES  encryption process requires. 
The third class of RFID authentication protocol adopts lightweight encryption primitive. 
Those schemes utilize the common bit-wise arithmetic operations to perform data 
encryption task. By doing so, both the low-cost requirement and security robustness for a 
passive RFID tag can be achieved simultaneously. In 2006, Peris-Lopez et al. (Peris-Lopez et 
al., 2006) proposed a series of authentication protocols which involve simple bit-wise 
operations such as AND, OR, XOR and addition mod 2m. These schemes are very cost-
effective and attractive to RFID systems with resource-constrained tags. Nevertheless, Li et 
al. (Li & Wang, 2007; Li & Deng, 2007; Li, 2008) showed that there are two vulnerabilites, de-
synchronization and full-disclosure attack, in these schemes proposed by Peris-Lopez et al.  
However, Li-Wang’s enhancement scheme still cannot successfully remedy these two 
security weaknesses as shown by Chien and Hwang (Chien & Huang, 2007). In 2007, Chien 
(Chien, 2007) proposed a new lightweight authentication protocol and corrected the 
drawback of Peris-Lopez’s schemes by applying bit-rotation function. Even though Chien 
claimed his scheme can provide more robust security features than Peris-Lopez’s schemes, 
the Chien’s scheme still is vulnerable in subtle situations. For example, if the IDS value of 
Chien’s scheme does not update in a period of time, the tag sent the same IDS response to 
reader might be tracked by adversary. 
The forth class of RFID authentication protocol complies with the EPCglobal standard. 
Sarma et al. (Sarma & Engels, 2003) developed a mutual authentication scheme using 
pseudo-random number generator only. Although the scheme meets the implementation 
requirements of the EPCglobal standard, it suffers the problem of tag identification 
disclosure. Chien and Chen (Chien & Chen, 2007) proposed an enhanced EPCglobal 
complied authentication protocol. However, Lo and Yeh (Lo & Yeh, 2007) showed that 
Chien and Chen’s scheme cannot provide forward security and suffer heavy computation 
workload at the backend server. Correspondingly, Lo and Yeh proposed a new 
authentication scheme to improve user privacy and data security.  
3. Proposed SMAP-LRS protocol 
As we mentioned above, the research in the past does not guarantee enough security for 
RFID system; previously proposed schemes only prevent a few specific types of security 
attacks. To implement encryption module in a passive RFID tag still requires lots of gates 
and space. In consequence, the cost of tag becomes more expensive and the tag needs more 
power to drive. Strong encryption operations, as more computing time required, might also 
delay tag response time. Most of passive tags cannot afford the resource demand from 
strong encryption primitive at present. The EPCglobal Class1 Gen2 tag standard only 
defines CRC function and pseudo-random number generator for tag to operate. Although 
some lightweight encryption primitives for RFID tags are introduced and claim that they are 
adaptive to the resource constraint of RFID tag (Duc et al., 2006; Juels, 2005; Karthikeyan & 
Nesterenko, 2005), most of them have not demonstrated that these schemes can really work 
on passive tags to achieve security requirement. Poschmann et al. (Poschmann et al., 2007; 
Poschmann et al., 2006) had proposed a new hash function requiring less number of gates to 
supply the need of lightweight encryption primitives for RFID authentication. Although this 
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method seems to be lightweight enough to fit in a low-cost RFID tag, the security strength of 
this hash function still remains as an open question. In the following, we introduce a newly 
designed authentication protocol, which uses simple bit-wise arithmetic operations such as 
AND, OR, XOR and ROT (bit rotation) to achieve the security and privacy requirements of 
low-cost RFID system. 
3.1 System assumption 
We assume that tag is vulnerable to be compromised. When the tag was compromised, the 
secret information of tag which contains shared symmetric key and tag identification can be 
retrieved by adversary. The system assumption of our scheme is described below. Our 
protocol has three main components: tag, reader and the backend server. Tags are passive 
tags, reader is the equipment to collect data from tags, and the backend server is to analyze 
the collected data. The communication channel between tag and reader are classified into 
two categories, forward channel and backscatter channel. The backscatter channel is namely 
as back channel and reverse channel. The communication channel between reader and 
backend database is a well protected and trusted system, so that transmitted message 
cannot be violated or eavesdropped by adversary. In other word, it cannot get any secret 
information from backend server. Each tag contains four filed data including ID, Tkey, t and 
flag. ID is the identification of RFID tag. According to EPC global standard, the length of tag 
identification can be 64bits, 96bits and 128bits and 256bits. Accordingly, we assume a 
reasonable length of tag identification is 96 bits.  Sometimes, it has the probability of 1/296 to 
generate the same identification because the length of tag identification has only 96 bits. 
Many researchers also provide complete solution for tag collision (Shih et al., 2006; Lee et al., 
2004). Hence, we think that tag collision is almost impossible happened for RFID tag. Tkey is 
the shared secret information in RFID tags as well as an encryption key. t is the counter 
value represented as total query times. The database includes two data, ID and Tkey. We 
assume the length of Tkey and t is the 96 bits as ID. Finally, we present the system notation in 
the following. Note that the flag mechanism design at backend server is used for solving 
DoS attack. 
• S: random generator number is generated by reader for each session. 
• flag: the value is used to indicate the tag is normal state(flag=0) or exceptional 
state(flag=1). 
• i : the i th session 
• IDi, IDi': the identification of tag at tag and backend server. 
• IDiL, IDiL': the left half of tag identification at tag and backend server. 
• IDiR, IDiR': the right half of tag identification at tag and backend server. 
• Tkey , Tkey': the secret symmetric key of tag at tag and backend server. 
• TkeyL, TkeyL': the left half of secret symmetric key of tag at tag and backend server. 
• TkeyR, TkeyR': the right half of secret symmetric key of tag at tag and backend server. 
• t: a counter value of tag, when flag is one, it generates a value to encrypt the message. 
• M1, M2, M3, M4, M1', M2', M3' and M4': the encrypted message at tag and backend server. 
• K1, K2, K1' and K2': the symmetric secret keys of tag which update for each session at tag 
and backend server. 
• R, R': the certificated message at tag and backend server. 
• RL, RL': the left half of certificated message R at tag and backend server. 
• RR, RR': the right half of certificated message R of tag at tag and backend server. 
www.intechopen.com
 Development and Implementation of RFID Technology 
 
296 
• IDi+1, IDi+1': the updated identification of tag at tag and backend server. 
• IDx: the identification of tag in any session 
• ⊕: XOR 
• /\: AND 
• \/: OR 
• ║: Concatenation 
• +: ADD 
• Rot(x, y): left rotate the value of x with y bits 
3.2 Mutual authentication protocol 
In this section, we propose a new mutual authentication protocol namely SMAP-LRS. 
SMAP-LRS is based on two conditions, the first one is normal state (flag is zero) and second 
one is exceptional state (flag is one). After the authentication is successfully completed, the 
protocol switches to normal state and the flag of tag will be changed from one to zero. 
The proposed scheme consists of two different conditions based on previous authentication 
session is safely terminated (flag = 0) or not (flag =1). The condition of normal state is 
illustrated as Fig. 1. 
 
 
Fig. 1. The normal state of mutual authentication protocol 
Condition 1: previous authentication session is safely terminated (flag = 0) 
Step1: Reader → Tag: Query 
The reader generates random number S and sends it as a query command to tag. 
Step2: Tag → Reader: flag, M2, RL 
When tag receives the query S from reader, it checks the flag state to decide the protocol is 
normal state. First, tag computes M1=Rot((Tkey /\ IDi) , IDiR) and response value 
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M2=IDi⊕S⊕M1 which protect ID to avoid from eavesdropping. Second, tag computes TkeyL, 
TkeyR and K1=Rot(IDiL,TkeyL )║Rot(TkeyR,IDiR ) to generate certificated message R=IDi \/ Tkey /\ 
K1. The certificated message R will be used to authenticate the tag and reader. Finally, the 
tag will send these response value flag, M2, RL to reader. 
Step3: Reader → Backend Server: S, flag, M2, RL 
After the reader receives the response from tags, it appends the number S and forwards to 
backend server. 
Step4: Backend Server → Reader: M3' 
When backend server receives the authentication request (flag, M2, RL, S) from reader, server 
computers all M1'=Rot((Tkey' /\ IDi') , IDiR'). Next, the server reuses M1' to creates the 
M2'=IDi'⊕S⊕M1' to verify the M2. If M2’ is the same as M2, it finds the corresponding record 
form the database. Otherwise, it terminates the authentication immediately. 
After retrieving the value of relative field in the corresponding record, the server computes 
the K1'=Rot(IDiL',TkeyL' )║Rot(TkeyR',IDiR' ). Next, the backend server keeps to create the 
certificated message R'=IDi' \/ Tkey' /\ K1'. The server uses the left half of certificated 
message R', called RL' to verify whether RL' is equal the RL or not. This verification process 
can ensure the data integrity; otherwise it will terminate the process and respond anything. 
In order to avoid the tracking attack, the server updates the identification of tag 
IDi+1=Rot((IDi⊕Tkey⊕S) , RL) for each session. With new identification, the server can 
calculates the certificated message M3'=IDi+1'⊕RR and transmits it to tag though reader. 
Step5: Reader → Tag : M3' 
When tag receives M3', it computes the new identification of tag and uses the updated 
identification of tag IDi+1 to generate the certificated message M3. If the M3 is equal to M3', 
the tag updates the old identification ID with new identification IDi+1. Until the process is 
successful finished, the tag also resets the flag value to zero. 
When the authentication between tag and reader is not completely finished, the flag value 
will be changed from zero to one. For example, when the authentication is proceeding, once 
tag does not receive any response from original reader in a period time or the response is 
invalid, the tag which still receives the query from reader may change its condition to 
exceptional state. The condition of exceptional state is illustrated as Fig. 2. 
Condition 2: previous authentication session is not safely terminated (flag = 1) 
Step1: Reader → Tag: Query 
The reader generates random number S and sends it as a query command to tag. 
Step2: Tag → Reader: flag, M2, M3, RL 
When tag receives the query again and not terminates safely, it means that it is an 
exceptional state. So, the tag will calculate the t = (t+2t+TkeyL) mod length (IDi ) value by using 
Tkey and mod function. By using t value, the tag generates the another identification, namely 
as M1=Rot(IDi , t) and computes the M2=S⊕Tkey⊕M1 with S and Tkey. In order to use the t 
value to resolve the M2, we must send the t value to the backend server. The only way is to 
protect t value by using Tkey and M1. Thus, the M3=(Tkey /\ M1)⊕t is a ciphertext to protect 
the t value. At the same time, the tag  computes the K1=Rot(TkeyL,TkeyR+t)║Rot(TkeyR,TkeyL-t) to 
generate the message R=Tkey \/ M1 /\ K1. The certificated message R value will be utilized 
to conform whether the tag is legal or not. Finally, the tag responds flag, M2, M3 and RL to 
reader. 
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Fig. 2. The exceptional state of mutual authentication protocol 
Step3: Reader → Backend Server: S, flag, M2, M3, RL 
When reader receives the response from tag, it appends S and forwards to the backend 
server. 
Step4: Backend Server→ Reader: M4' 
When backend server collects a round of message from reader, it retrieves the 
M1'=M2'⊕S⊕Tkey' by using S, Tkey' and M2'. M2' value is the same as M2 which sends from 
tag. then, the backend server decrypts the M3 with Tkey' and M1' to obtain the t'=(Tkey' /\ 
M1')⊕M3 value. By using t' value, we can calculate K1= Rot(TkeyL,TkeyR+t')║Rot(TkeyR,TkeyL-t') to 
generate the certificated message R'=Tkey \/ M1'/\ K1'. Next, backend server verifies 
whether the RL' is equal to RL or not. If the pair of values is not match, the authentication 
process will be terminated immediately. Otherwise, it means that the backend server can 
identify correctly the corresponding tuple of database. Finally, it computes the K2'=Rot(TkeyR', 
TkeyR'-t')║Rot(TkeyL', TkeyL'+t') with TkeyR', TkeyL'. By using the updated identification of tag 
IDi+1'=Rot((K2'⊕Tkey⊕S), RL') and the right half of R' to create the certificated message 
M4'=IDi+1'⊕RR, the certificated message M4' provides a proof for tag to verify the reality of 
reader. 
Step5: Reader → Tag : M4' 
while the tag receives the message M4' from backend server, it calculates the new tag 
identification IDi+1=Rot((K2⊕Tkey⊕S) , RL). By using the right half of R and IDi+1, the backend 
server can create the certificated message M4 =IDi+1⊕RR to compare whether the M4' is equal 
to M4 or not. if M4' is the same as M4, the identification of tag will change to IDi+1 and reset 
the flag to zero. 
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4. Security and performance analysis 
For the sake of clarity, the aim of this section is to analyze our authentication scheme and 
compare it with related literature based on following security and performance criterions. 
First of all, we explain that how to ensure that the protocol is well protected. We illustrate 
each security analysis in section 4.1. Secondly, we have a comparison for our scheme in 
storage, operation and communication in section 4.2. 
4.1 Security analysis 
In this section, we conduct security analysis to proposed authentication scheme. 
• Data security 
The transmitted message between tag and reader is a ciphertext by using AND, OR, XOR 
and ROT function. The encrypted message for each session is encrypted by random-
generated one time valid numbers to perform beneficial computation. Even if the ciphertext 
can be modified or eavesdropped, the transmitted messages which provide the security 
robustness of meaningful data will not be compromised. So we believe that the transmitted 
message is secure enough to ensure the confidentiality of the transmitted data. 
• Anonymity 
For each tag, the information of tag is changed dynamically in each session. Even if the 
authentication process between tag and reader is failure, the tag still has its mechanism to 
keep the responded message different. In normal state, the transmitted messages are 
encrypted by different S and ID. In exceptional state, the transmitted message still keeps 
being changed by using updated t value. Generally speaking, no matter the authentication is 
success or not, the tag will modify its own data in every session. Hence, the attacker cannot 
find consistent clues of each tag response to track a specific tag easily. 
• Replay attack resistance 
SAMP-RLS is a challenge-response protocol using pseudo-random number to prevent 
replay attack. The message M1, M2 and M3 are refreshing by using S and ID in each section. 
Hence, the malicious attack cannot reuse the original message to pass the authentication. 
• Denial of Service resistance 
As we noted above, DoS attack have two different definition. By using a flag mechanism, 
our scheme allows the tag with constant secret key can still be authentication by backend 
server and re-synchronize its data with databases. Additionally, comparing other schema 
against Dos attack, our schema can replace dual tuple of secret information values (new and 
old) to save lots of storage space in backend server. 
• Forward security 
If the adversary collects a series of past transmitted messages and get the secret information 
of tag in a period. The adversary infers transmitted messages to obtain previous relationship 
of data. Because the identification (ID) of tag is dynamically changed for each session, the 
adversary is unable to obtain the previous data by using the current secret information of 
tag and have no co relationship between messages transmitted in consecutive session. The 
adversary cannot generate new identification and track further recorder. However, if the 
adversary try to compromise tag to know all data stored in, the attacker still could not trace 
back the trajectory of compromised tag in our scheme. 
• Mutual authentication 
SAMP-RLS provides both tag to reader and reader to tag authentications. The RL is the 
certificated code to verify the tag. On the contrary, the RR is the certificated code to verify 
the reader. Hence, our scheme indeed reaches the aim of mutual authentication. 
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Introducing the security analysis in our scheme provides the well protection for command 
attacks. A simple comparison of recent authentication protocols is listed in Table 1. We 
compare the similar operations of authentication protocols such as EMAP, M2AP, LAMP, 
SASI, etc. 
According to the Table 1 above, our scheme use simple operation to secure message to 
achieve the requirement of security. It also provides strong security against all kinds of 
command attacks. 
 
 SMAP-LRS EMAP M2AP LAMP SASI 
Data security Y N N N Y 
Anonymity Y N N N N 
Replay attack resistant Y N N N Y 
DoS resistant Y N N N Y 
Forward security Y N N N Y 
Mutual authentication Y N N N Y 
Table 1. Comparison of other simple operation scheme 
4.2 Performance analysis 
Our protocol also compares the performance analysis, including storage, operation and 
communication. In our research, we know that the memory space of our scheme decrease 5L 
of storage and 0.5L of communication for the SASI mechanism which is the most low-cost 
scheme currently. Hence, our scheme reduced about fifty percent of memory space is less 
than other scheme at present. 
In our scheme, we assume that the lengths of the identification or key are 96 bit as L bits. 
First, storage is separated into two parts, one is the memory of tag and the other is the 
memory of database. The database memory of our scheme contains ID and Tkey are 2L bits. 
Because the memory space of flag is one bit, the tag memory of our scheme contained ID, 
Tkey, t and flag are about 3L bits. Second, the recent papers in designing the authentication 
protocol usually use hash, Pseudo-random number generator and CRC to protection their 
protocol. However, our scheme only uses simple operations that fit the requirement of 
passive tag such as AND, XOR, OR and Rot function. Hence, we believe that simple 
operation can ensure not only security requirement but also low-cost demanded, especially 
for EPC global standard. Third, the communication between reader and tag also should be 
considered because the energy of passive tag comes from reader. The length of message 
decides the consumption of energy to transmit range. It is an important factor to dispatch 
the power energy and control the communication. The total communications of our scheme 
including flag, M2, M3’ and RL is 2.5L bits when our scheme is a normal state. Even if our 
scheme is exceptional state, the communication of our scheme including flag, M2, M3, M4’ 
and RL is only 3.5L bits. We believe that our communication is less 0.5L than SASI at least. 
We list a comparison summary of various schemes in Table 2. We also count the number 
of simple operation in detail to compare with other low cost authentication protocols in 
Table 3. 
www.intechopen.com
A Secure Mutual Authentication Protocol for Low-cost RFID System 
 
301 
Memory storage 
 
Tag Backend Server
Operation Communication 
EMAP (Peris-Lopez et al., 2006) 6L 6L ⊕, /\ , \/ 5L 
M2AP (Peris-Lopez et al., 2006) 6L 6L ⊕, /\ , \/ ,＋ 5L 
LMAP (Peris-Lopez et al., 2006) 6L 6L ⊕, /\ , \/ , ＋ 4L 
SASI (Chien, 2007) 4L 7L ⊕, /\ , \/ ,＋, Rot 4L 
SMAP-LRS 3L 2L ⊕, /\ , \/ , Rot, mod 3.5L 
Table 2. The comparison of required memory, operation and communication 
 LMAP M2AP EMAP SASI SMAP-LRS SMAP-LRS 
Authentication state Flag = 0 Flag =1 
 T R+B T R+B T R+B T R+B T R+B T R+B 
AND 0 0 1 1 2 2 0 0 2 2 2 2 
OR 0 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 1 1 1 1 
XOR 2 2 1 2 6 5 6 6 3 3 4 4 
ADD 1 3 1 2 0 0 3 3 0 0 0 0 
ROT 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 
Update state Flag = 0 Flag = 1 
AND 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
OR 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
XOR 10 10 10 10 10 10 4 4 2 2 2 2 
ADD 5 5 5 5 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 
ROT 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 2 3 3 5 5 
Total 18 21 19 21 19 18 18 18 12 12 15 15 
Table 3. The counter of simple operation 
5. Conclusion 
In this chapter, we present a secure mutual authentication protocol for low-cost resource-
constrained RFID tag system under insecure wireless communication environment. The 
introduction of three security-enhanced designs in our scheme provides a more robust RFID 
authentication process. First, a flag state mechanism is proposed to prevent DoS attack and 
reduce the data storage space at the backend server by eliminating the need of storing dual 
tuples in database. Second, simple operations such as AND, XOR, OR, bit addition (mod 2m) 
and bit rotation function are introduced to be compatible with EPCglobal Class1 Gen2 
standard and to fit in the computation limitation of resource-constrained tag. Third, the 
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proposed scheme SAMP-RLS provides data security to defend against major security threats 
such as replay attack and eavesdropping. In addition, SAMP-RLS possesses privacy 
protection features such as anonymity and forward secrecy. In terms of resource utilization, 
the required memory space of our scheme for a RFID system decreases about 45% to 50% in 
comparison with other existing mutual authentication protocols. In summary, our mutual 
authentication protocol offers data security enhancement, privacy protection ability and 
better resource utilization in comparison with other RFID authentication protocols. 
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